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POLICY FORUM
I N T E L L E C T UA L P RO P E RT Y

Patents on Human Genes:
An Analysis of Scope and Claims
Jordan Paradise, *Lori Andrews, Timothy Holbrook

atents by their very nature limit what
others can do, offering a period of
exclusive rights over the invention to
the patent holder in return for public disclosure of information about the patented invention so that other inventors can build on it—
for example, by making a better mousetrap
out of other materials. In the case of a human
gene sequence, however, the “invention” is
the information. Consequently, disclosure of
that information does not allow others to
build on it. Gene patents, especially, limit
what can be done in the realm of scientific
research and medical care because there are
no alternatives to a patented gene in diagnosis, treatment, and research (1–4). When
gene patents are granted improperly and in
an overly broad manner, those problems are
compounded.
U.S. patent law requires that subject
matter be useful (5), novel (6), and nonobvious (7) and fulfill four basic disclosure
requirements: written description, enablement, best mode, and def initeness (8).
When a patent is issued, the patent holder
gains the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the invention for 20 years (9).

P

Evaluating Gene Patent Claims
To gain an understanding of whether the
claims contained within issued patents covering human genetic material meet the
existing statutory requirements under U.S.
patent law (10), we undertook a multiyear
project overseen by an advisory board that
included two geneticists, two consumer
advocates, and the head of an organization
that runs a nonprofit tissue bank.
Eleven project personnel (including
lawyers, licensed members of the Patent
Bar, law students, and molecular biologists)
identified human gene patents that represented a range of genetic diseases—from
single gene to multigene disorders, from
diseases where the genetic predisposition
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has been identified to those where the causal
nexuses are still being identified. We used
the term “human gene patent” to include not
only patents on complete human gene
sequences, but patents that cover any human
genetic material, such as mutations in a
gene, or diagnostic methods that utilize
human genetic material that would effec-

tors are expected to consult in order to
investigate whether something has been
patented or there is an application pending.
The patents that we analyzed are not an
exhaustive list of human gene patents
issued by the USPTO during this period,
owing to the rolling time frame and our specific search terms.
For our analysis, we examined 74 relevant patents on human genetic material, all
of which contained multiple claims (such as
a claim over a gene or a claim over mutations of that gene). Because the USPTO and
the courts examine each claim with respect
to its validity, we did so as well, assessing
the 1167 claims in the 74 patents. Where the
project personnel felt that a specific claim
did not meet one or more of the legal requirements of patentability, it was deemed
problematic. These
findings are the conclusions of project personnel and are not necessarily predictive of
eventual validity determinations by the courts
or the USPTO.
We found that 38%
of claims were problematic (see table on
page 1567). Some claims had multiple
problems, resulting in 677 cumulative problems within the 448 problematic claims. Of
the 677 total problems identified, written
description and enablement/utility problems were the most frequent (see figure
page 1567). Many patents claimed far more
than what the inventor actually discovered.
Some applicants took advantage of the
redundancy of the genetic code by, for
example, claiming the sequence of a protein
within a patent and then also asserting
rights over all of the DNA sequences that
encode for that protein without describing
those DNA sequences.
Some patents exhibited written description problems by claiming discoveries the
patent holder did not specifically describe.
One patent covers not only the particular
polymorphism the inventor discovered but
all other polymorphisms discovered in the
future by anyone else in a region encompassing over 12 mega–base pairs (Mbp).
Other patent claims were problematic with
respect to utility. In one patent, the inventor
had shown how a polymorphism could be used
to predict asthma. The inventor additionally
claimed various uses of the polymorphism to
predict other conditions, although the inventor
did not show that the polymorphism was
linked to those conditions.

…something needs to be done
about the number of human
gene patents being granted
that arguably do not measure up
to the federal patent law.”

“

tively preclude the use of that material by
others. We chose genetic diseases that were
subject to public attention and for which
problems in gene patents could potentially
have an impact on research and health care.
The human gene patents were not chosen
with any expectation that they would have
problems with their claims.
The analysis was done in a rolling fashion over the period of January 2003 to May
2004, to generate a database of at least 1000
individual claims. Initially, we examined
human gene patents that dealt with the main
gene or genes associated with two multigenic diseases: Alzheimer’s disease and
breast cancer. We then examined four single-gene diseases: ataxia telangiectasia,
Canavan disease, familial dysautonomia,
and hereditary hemochromatosis. We then
chose three diseases that were multigenic in
nature and whose genetic basis was less
clear, for which a number of genes have
been identif ied as playing a key role:
asthma, obesity, and schizophrenia.
A list of human gene patents for the nine
selected genetic diseases was generated by
means of the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office (USPTO) database, advance search
option (11). We used the USPTO Web site
because it is the publicly accessible, federal
government site that scientists and inven-
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Another troubling issue arose where a
BREAKDOWN OF PROBLEMS
claim was drafted disclosing only a correlaIDENTIFIED IN
tion between two things, often the presence of
HUMAN GENE PATENTS FROM
an isoform or mutation and some multigenic
NINE GENETIC DISEASES
disorder or a disorder having a genetic comTotal patents
74
ponent. In some cases, the patent holder did
Total
claims
1167
not describe how the correlation was used to
predict the disease. One such patent claims a
Total claims with problems
448
method of detecting whether a subject is at
Cumulative problems
667
increased risk of developing late-onset
Alzheimer’s disease, comprising directly or
indirectly detecting the presence or absence ning patents on genes entirely or narrowing
of a particular protein isoform. The claim their scope, exempting researchers and diagdoes not account for other factors that relate nosticians from the reach of the patents, creto a person’s developing Alzheimer’s disease ating a system of either patent pools or comand does not indicate the specific relation pulsory licensing, recognizing the rights of
between the presence of the isoform and the third parties to oppose the granting of a parincreased risk, but merely provides that there ticular gene patent, and allowing the people
is a correlation. In fact, even where a patient who are the sources of the patented genes to
does not have the isoform, he or she could have a greater say in their use (4).
still develop the disease, and those with the
Another avenue may be to have the
isoform might never develop the disease. The USPTO remedy internal problems that lead
“indirect” detection method is also vague to the issuance of gene patents that arguably
enough that it could include any diagnosis do not comply with existing patent law. This
based on external factors as well, such as is not a new problem or one that is specific to
memory loss (a diagnostic method that was gene patents (14, 15). As with any new technot invented by the patent applicant).
nology, the USPTO must have competent
We also found patent claims that suffered patent examiners to guarantee that patents
from one or more problems but were saved are not issued that are overly broad or overarfrom being classified as problematic by the ching. For example, examiners in the newly
drafting language. For example, one claim created business method patent category
reads, “(t)he method of claim 1, 2, or 3, were criticized in the late 1990s for granting
wherein the method furpoor-quality, overbroad
ther comprises amplifypatents lacking novelty,
13.1%
ing the sequence-altered
all of which are problems
PAH DNA by use of the
attributed to improper
37.5%
polymerase chain reactechnical backgrounds,
6.9%
tion (PCR).” Two of the
inadequate training, and
three referenced claims
f inancial incentives.
were problematic. Claim
Because some examiners
1 had written description,
within the patent office
enablement/utility, and
may not be familiar with
42.4%
novelty/nonobviousness
DNA-based technoloproblems and claim 3 had
gies, one potential remenablement/utility probedy may be more trainWritten description
lems. Project personnel
ing or special selection
Enablement/utility
concluded that this
of patent examiners from
Novelty/nonobviousness
claim was not problema related educational
Definiteness
atic, however, because it
background (14).
referenced claim 2, Analysis of problems observed
Some have even
which contained no within claims.
argued that applications
problems with any of the
should be reviewed by
established categories. This language may the USPTO with different levels of scrutiny,
create a chilling effect on researchers who depending on how much social cost they
want to use methods listed in claims 1 and 3 entail (14). Reports indicate that on averof the patent, but do not realize that the patent age, the total time spent by a patent examis open to challenge as not validly covering iner on a patent application is about 18
those methods.
hours (16). With gene patent applications
often involving extensive biological
Discussion
sequence information for each individual
Prior studies have found that gene patents claim, it may be that adequate time is not
have the potential to deter medical research being invested in thoroughly investigating
and health care (12, 13). A variety of policy the patentability of the claimed material.
alternatives are being considered to remedy Where the enforcement of a patent has the
these negative effects. These include ban- potential to be so costly to society in terms
www.sciencemag.org
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of medical research, health care, and downstream innovation because there are no adequate substitutes, safeguards could be
installed to ensure that the application is
examined more closely (14).
The USPTO could also revamp financial
incentives to promote decisions based on
the quality of patents rather than their quantity. Currently, patent examiners are encouraged with monetary bonuses to grant patent
applications, a policy that has the unsettling
effect of rewarding examiners for quickly
pushing patents through the patent office.
Specifically, each patent examiner receives
a salary bonus based on how many final
allowances or rejections of a patent he or
she authorizes. Because a rejection can be
challenged and may not become final for
quite some time, it is easier to receive a
bonus by allowing patents (14). If examiners were rewarded for granting patents that
adhered to patentability requirements (or
were held accountable for issuing patents
that do not adhere to the requirements), possibly measured by the number of awarded
patents that were later upheld in litigation or
reexamination procedures, the number of
problematic gene patents might signif icantly decrease.
Whether through amendments to the
patent law, alternative licensing mechanisms, or policy changes in the USPTO
itself, something needs to be done about the
number of human gene patents being
granted that arguably do not measure up to
the federal patent law.
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